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SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Robinson v. United States, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)
Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973)
In United States v. Robinson' and Gustafson
v. Florida2 the Supreme Court held that when
there is a lawful custodial arrest, a full search
of the person arrested is not only an exception
to the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment3 but is also a "reasonable" search
under that amendment. The absence of proba-
ble fruits or further evidence of the particular
crime for which the arrest is made does not
narrow the scope applicable to such a search.
Both Robinson and Gustafson involved vio-
lations of the motor vehicle laws which led to
the arrest and subsequent search of the drivers.
Robinson was driving a 1965 Cadillac when he
was observed by officer Richard Jenks. Based
on an investigation made four days earlier
after a previous stop of Robinson, Officer
Jenks had reason to believe that Robinson was
driving with his license revoked; he therefore
signaled Robinson to stop and placed him
under arrest for "operating after revocation
and obtaining a permit by misrepresentation." 4
Following established police procedure for
the District of Columbia, Jenks then began to
search Robinson. During the pat down, Jenks
felt an object in the heavy coat Robinson was
wearing. The object did not feel like a gun
and Jenks testified he had no particular indica-
tion that it was a weapon of any kind.5 Jenks
1414 U.S. 218 (1973).
2 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
3 U.S. CoxsT. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
4 D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-302(d) (1967). This is
an offense defined by statute of the District of Co-
lumbia which carries a mandatory minimum jail
term, a mandatory minimum fine, or both.
5 414 U.S. 218, 241 (1973) (Marshall J., dis-
senting).
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removed the object, however, and found it to
be a crumpled cigarette pack which he then
opened to examine the contents. Inside were
fourteen gelatin capsules, later identified as con-
taining heroin. This heroin seized from Robin-
son was admitted into evidence at the trial.
Robinson was then convicted in the district
court of possession and facilitation of conceal-
ment of heroin.
After remanding the case to the district
court for an evidentiary hearing as to the
exact scope of the search, the court of appeals
reversed the conviction holding that heroin in-
troduced in evidence against the respondent
had been obtained as a result of a search
which violated the fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution.6 The Supreme
Court, however, found that a lawful custodial
arrest authorized a full search of a person. The
Court felt that the evidence obtained through
such a search, even if unrelated to the specific
crime for which the arrest was made, was
properly admitted at trial.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority
in Robinson, noted that a search of a person
incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional ex-
ception to the warrant requirement. 7 The ma-
jority admitted that disputes had arisen con-
cerning the area surrounding the person which
may be searched incident to his arrest,
particularly since the establishment of the ex-
6 United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
7 See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969) ; United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56
(1950) ; Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145
(1947) ; Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192
(1927) ; Carroll v. United States. 267 U.S. 132
(1925). While these cases acknowledge the right
of the police to search a person whom they have
arrested, the issue before the Court has generally
been the permissible area surrounding the person
which may be searched, and thus, the Court's rec-
ognition of the right to search the person himself
is not detailed or dispositive on the issue.
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clusionary rule in Weeks v. United States.8
They nevertheless found that the right to
search the person arrested had been virtually
unchallenged until the present case.9 The Su-
preme Court had consistently recognized this
general authority to search, 10 Justice Rehnquist
argued, even in the most recent cases before
it." Since these cases not only recognized this
type of search as an exception to the warrant
requirement but also as an "affirmative author-
ity to search," the majority felt that the cases
clearly implied that the searches are also rea-
sonable under the fourth amendment.'
2
The court of appeals had applied the "stop
and frisk" standard of Terry v. Ohio"s to a
search incident to an arrest for a traffic viola-
tion. No further evidence could be obtained,
and the only remaining rationale for the search,
according to the court of appeals in Robinson,
was to discover any weapons which might
be concealed on the arrestee.14 The Supreme
8232 U.S. 383 (1914). This rule held that evi-
dence seized in a search that violated the fourth
amendment could be excluded from the subsequent
trial of the person arrested.
9 The Court cites Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20 (1925), as an example of the long recog-
nition given by the courts to the right to search
an arrested person:
The right without a search warrant contem-
poraneously to search persons lawfully ar-
rested while committing crime and to search
the place where the arrest is made in order to
find and seize things connected with the crime
as well as weapons and other things to effect
an escape from custody, is not to be doubted.
Id. at 30.
10 See note 7 supra.
11 Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973); Adams
v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
12 414 U.S. at 226.
'13 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The test established in
Terry is "whether the officer's action was justified
at its inception and whether it was reasonably re-
lated in scope to the circumstances which justified
the interference in the first place." Id. at 19.
Applying this test, the Court in Terry held that a
stop and frisk was the only action permissible by
a police officer when he was merely stopping
someone for a traffic violation since no evidence
could be obtained. The only justification for any
type of search was to protect the officer by seek-
ing concealed weapons. Since this would ostensibly
be the only purpose for a search when the person
was arrested for a traffic offense, the court of ap-
peals in Robinson extended the stop and frisk lim-
itation to full custody arrests for traffic offenses.
'4 The court of appeals relied heavily upon
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), and Peters v. New
Court, however, drew a sharp distinction be-
tween a stop and frisk situation and a full cus-
tody arrest. The Terry protective frisk could
be made on less than probable cause and was a
cursory procedure since the encounter between
the officer and the person would be fleeting. In
a full custody arrest, however, the person
would be in contact with the officer for an ex-
tended period and the chance of serious harm
resulting from a concealed weapon would be
more pronounced.' 5 These differences were so
striking in the eyes of the majority that they
disallowed any comparison of Terry with Rob-
inson.
The Robinson majority disagreed with the
court of appeals and the dissenting Supreme
Court justices as to whether a search incident
to an arrest must be limited to either 1) a
search for concealed weapons, or 2) a search
for fruits and instrumentalities of the crime for
which the person was arrested. These two jus-
tifications for this exception to the warrant re-
quirement appear in many Supreme Court
opinions.' 6 The passage discussed by the ma-
jority in Robinson comes from Peters v. New
York:'7
the incident search was obviously justified
'by the need to seize weapons and other things
which might be used to assault an officer or
effect an escape, as well as by the need to
prevent the destruction of evidence of the
crime.' Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364,
367 (1964). Moreover, it was reasonably lim-
ited in scope by these purposes. Officer Laskey
did not engage in an unrestrained and thor-
ough going examination of Peters and his per-
sonal effects.' 8
The majority recognized these purposes as ac-
ceptable justifications for a search incident to
York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), to establish a scope
limitation principle for permissible searches, i.e.
the scope of the search incident to an arrest must
be limited to the reason for which the arrest was
made. For further discussion see Note, Scope Lim-
itations for Searches Incident to Arrest, 78 YALE
L.J. 433 (1969); and Note, Searches of the Per-
son Incident to Lawful Arrest, 69 CoLum. L. Rzv.
866 (1969).
1 414 U.S. at 234.
16 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763
(1969); Preston v. United States 376 U.S. 364,
367 (1964).
1r 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
1s 392 U.S. at 67.
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arrest, but did not consider it necessary to
limit an officer to the use of one of these crite-
ria to later justify his actions in searching a
person under arrest. Even if these were the
only permissible rationales for a police search,
the majority would still permit a full search of
the person placed under a full custody arrest
because of the greater danger of concealed
weapons.19 The majority felt that this "is an
adequate basis for treating all custodial arrests
alike for the purposes of search justification.
' 20
By permitting a full search after a traffic ar-
rest, the Court sought to avoid a case by case
review to determine if a challenged search met
one of the two purposes enunciated by pre-
vious decisions as justifying a search incident
to an arrest. The Court established a presump-
tion of reasonableness for a full search by stat-
ing that if the arrest was lawful then "a search
incident to the arrest requires no additional
justification." 21 The Court would still be will-
ing, however, to consider a claim from the per-
son searched that the search was unnecessarily
abusive or severe as in Rochin v. California
2 2
where the person arrested was forced to un-
dergo a stomach pump process to recover evi-
dence he had swallowed. But the Court consid-
ered that the search in Robinson, albeit
thorough, was still reasonable.
Perhaps the strongest statement of the
Court's reasoning came in the concurring opin-
ion to both Robinson and Gustafson written by
Justice Powell. His basic premise was that an
"individual lawfully subjected to a custodial
arrest retains no significant Fourth Amend-
ment interest in the privacy of his person." 23
The mere fact that a custodial arrest has been
lawfully made justified the search for Justice
Powell, and he viewed a further requirement
of some additional independent justification for
such a search simply as a frustration of law
enforcement. Thus for Justice Powell the in-
trusion into the privacy of a person by virtue
of a full custody arrest is so pervasive that any
1o.See Abel. v. United States, 362 U.S. 217
(1960); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20
(1925).
20 414 U.S. at 235.
21 Id.
22 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
23 414 U.S. at 237 (Powell, J., concurring).
further intrusion through a full search is
insignificant.
2 4
Justice Marshall, with Justices Douglas and
Brennan joining, wrote the dissent which fo-
cused clearly on the need for a neutral judicial
determination on a case by case basis of the
reasonableness of any search.2 5 This principle,
they contended, is in direct contrast with the
desire of the majority to establish a per se rule
of reasonableness of searches incident to ar-
rest. In establishing a per se rule, the majority
sought to avoid overruling the ad hoc decisions
of police officers. The dissent contended, how-
ever, that review of such decisions fulfills the
exact purpose of the fourth amendment by en-
suring that quick police judgments are sub-
ject to control and review by the judiciary.
20
In the vast majority of cases a judicial
officer must determine beforehand if an inva-
sion of a person's privacy is justified.2 7 The
cases where no warrant is required are based
upon a "few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions." 28 One such recognized
exception is a search incident to an arrest
2 9
The dissent, however, was careful to point out
that an exception to a warrant requirement
alone does not preclude further judicial inquiry
into the reasonableness of the search. On the
contrary, they argued that since the search in-
cident to arrest was an exception, the courts
should look carefully to ensure that the search
24 This statement of Justice Powell that no sig-
nificant fourth amendment interests in a person's
privacy remain after he has been subjected to a
full custody arrest is sweeping and perhaps even
hyperbolic. It is truly doubtful that Justice Powell
would uphold a search that was abusive or exces-
sively thorough when the arrest was made for a
mere traffic offense, and no other facts led a police
officer to expect more. Under facts different from
Robinson or Gustafson, then, Justice Powell would
probably give closer consideration to the rights of
a person who has been arrested.25 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971) ; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10
(1948); Go-Bart v. United States, 282 U.S. 344
(1931).
26 414 U.S. at 242 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
27 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356
(1967) ; Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33
(1925).
28 Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
29 See note 7 supra.
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meets the purposes for which the exception
was initially granted. 30
The dissent contended that the court of ap-
peals' dual justifications for a police search
were by no means novel. In Barnes v. State,31
for example, the police arrested a person for a
brake light violation and in the subsequent full
search found a quantity of marihuana. The Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin held that since the
person had been arrested, a frisk for weapons
would have been reasonable. But they found
the full search of the person violative of fourth
amendment rights.
Federal courts have also recognized the limi-
tations on a search incident to a traffic arrest.
In Amador-Gonzalez v. United States32 narcot-
ics were discovered on the driver in a search
following an arrest for a traffic offense. Judge
Wisdom found this search unreasonable and
cautioned that "fidelity to the Fourth Amend-
ment commands that the exception not engulf
the rule. The lawfulness of an arrest does not
always legitimate a search." 33 Therefore, Jus-
tice Marshall felt that only a search to dis-
cover evidence or a search to disarm the arres-
30 414 U.S. at 243 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964), the
justification was clearly stated:
The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is
justified, for example, by the need to seize
weapons and other things which might be used
to assault an officer or effect an escape, as
well as by the need to prevent the destruction
of evidence of the crime-things which might
easily happen where the weapon or evidence is
on the accused's person or under his immedi-
ate control. But these justifications are absent
where a search is remote in time or place
from the arrest.
376 U.S. at 367.
The dissent argued that these two rationales are
the only ones which could be used to justify a
search. Even though Preston v. United States, 376
U.S. 364 (1964), and Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752 (1969), dealt primarily with searching
the area surrounding the arrestee, the Court in
those cases also considered the purpose of a search
incident to arrest. The dissent in Robinson felt
that only these purposes could justify any searches
of the person or of the surrounding area.
31 25 Wis. 2d 116, 130 N.W.2d 264 (1964). Ac-
cord, State v. Curtis, 290 Minn. 429, 190 N.W.2d
631 (1971)(illegal right turn and defective tail-
lights); State v. O'Neal, 251 Ore. 163, 444 P.2d
951 (1968) (en baic) (expired temporary license).
32 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968). Accord, United
States v. Humphrey, 409 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir.
1969).
33 391 F2d at 313.
tee justified an exception to the warrant
requirement for searches incident to an arrest.
He found support for this conclusion in the
state and federal decisions which have limited
searches incident to a traffic arrest to a protec-
tive frisk for concealed weapons.34
The dissent further said that the majority's
desire to avoid case by case determinations of
reasonableness was "misguided as a matter of
principle." 35 They also felt it would not be
successful on a practical level since a case by
case determination would still have to be made
to determine if the police improperly used a
traffic arrest as a mere pretext for a search.30
The police have broad discretionary powers in
most cases either to issue a citation or to ar-
rest a person. The decision to arrest will al-
ways be subject to judicial review, the dissent
pointed out, to determine if the reasons for the
arrest were legitimate or merely a pretext to
search the person.
Justice Marshall rejected the blanket justifi-
cation of a full search for a traffic-related ar-
rest and stated that the search of Robinson
could be broken down into three stages: the
pat down, the removal of the cigarette pack,
34 It should be noted that some traffic offenses
would, however, permit a full search of the indi-
vidual. Typically when a driver is suspected of op-
erating a motor vehicle under the influence of al-
cohol or drugs the officer would have a legitimate
evidentiary purpose in subjecting the driver to a
full search.
Likewise, if anything the officer notices during a
stop for a traffic violation gives him probable
cause to suspect other criminal activity, he would
be authorized to search the persons. This type of
situation has led some courts to establish a rule
allowing a full search on a traffic offense, but
Judge Wisdom, in Amador-Gonzalez v. United
States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968), stated that
"when a case upholds the right to search incident
to a traffic arrest, it is because facts became read-
ily apparent to the officer which established proba-
ble cause." Id. at 317. Thus with no more indica-
tion of criminal activity or evidence than a traffic
offense, many courts would not allow a search to
go beyond a search for weapons even if the driver
is placed under a full custody arrest.
However, there may also be some statutory vio-
lations of a non-traffic nature for which no evi-
dence could be discovered by a search of the per-
son and the dissent would contend that these, too,
should be limited to a search for weapons only.
An offense such as vagrancy would fall under this
category.
35 414 U.S. at 248 (Marshall J., dissenting).
36 United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467
(1932). See also note 29 supra, where arrests for
traffic offenses were seen as pretexts for a search.
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and the examination of the contents of the
pack. The pat down, he decided, was fully jus-
tified by Terry as a protective search of the in-
dividual. The removal of the cigarette pack
was questionable since testimony showed that
the officer had no fear that it was a weapon;
yet, Justice Marshall seemed willing to admit
that a full custody arrest may allow a more
thorough investigation of the person arrested.37
However, the dissent found no justification
whatsoever for an examination of the contents
of the pack. Even if a weapon were concealed
in the pack the person could not utilize it since
the pack was in the custody of the officer.88
This was the crux of the case: the majority
stated that no justification was needed for a
full search beyond the fact of a valid custodial
7 Justice Marshall felt that a balance must be
struck between those factors permitting a limited
search and those allowing a fuller investigation of
the person. In the former category he found that
there was little reason to fear that a traffic of-
fender will be armed, especially one who, as Rob-
inson, had complied promptly with every police
directive. These considerations favored a more cir-
cumscribed scope of search for a traffic arrest.
However, in the latter category of factors favoring
a fuller search he found that the dangers inherent
in a full custody arrest provide a basis for allow-
ing a more complete search to ensure that no
weapons are concealed. Justice Marshall did not
decide in the present case whether the removal of
the cigarette case, with nothing more, was permis-
sible since the police went beyond that action to
delve into the contents of the pack itself. This lat-
ter intrusion made a pronouncement on the re-
moval of the pack unnecessary.
3s The dissent in the court of appeals sought to
justify this examination of the contents of the
pack as a protective measure since "if the package
had contained a razor blade, or live bullets, the of-
ficer would have been alerted to search Robinson
much more thoroughly since the possibility of
there being other weapons concealed on his person
would increase" 471 F.2d at 1118 (Wilkey J., dis-
senting) (emphasis in original). This line of rea-
soning was rejected by Chief Judge Bazelon of the
court of appeals and was not adopted by the ma-
jority of the Supreme Court which authorized the
search by the very fact of the custodial arrest.
The government also sought, on an alternative
theory, to justify looking into the cigarette pack
as an inventory search precedent to being placed
in jail. This argument found no apparent favor
with any member of the court since Robinson
could have posted collateral and thereby avoided
incarceration, thus eliminating the need for an in-
ventory search. Even if an inventory search were
required, moreover, it would not necessarily justify
the police delving into the personal effects of the
arrestee with a mere inventory purpose. See
United States v. Mills, 472 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
arrest; whereas, the dissent insisted that every
search incident to an arrest must be justified
by one of the purposes given to establish this
exception to the warrant requirement.
In Gustafson, the companion case to Robin-
son, the petitioner was arrested for driving
without a driver's license, which he had left at
home. A full search of his person revealed a
quantity of marihuana in a cigarette box in
his pocket, and he was later prosecuted suc-
cessfully for possession of narcotics. Again, as
in Robinson, lawful arrest was the key which
allowed a full search regardless of the fact that
no evidence could exist or that the officer had
no fear that the object seized was a weapon of
any kind.3 9 To justify this search, the majority
cited its statement in Robinson:
The authority to search a person incident to a
lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the
need to disarm and to discover evidence, does
not depend on what a court may later decide
was the probability in a particular arrest situ-
ation that weapons or evidence would in fact
be found upon the person of the suspect.4o
Thus, in the majority view, the presence of
probable cause to arrest a person is sufficient
reason to permit a full search of his person.
Again, Justice Marshall, with Justices Doug-
las and Brennan joining, wrote a dissent
which pointed to the dual purposes which jus-
tify a search incident to arrest, one of which
must be met in each such search. Considering
the facts of Gustafson, the dissent found no ev-
identiary basis for the search since the arrest
was made for driving without a license. 4' They
39 Gustafson had sought to distinguish his case
from Robinson in order to make a stronger argu-
ment that the search was unreasonable. Gustafson
contended that his case was different since there
had been no prior contact between Gustafson and
the police officer, as in Robinson, since the offense
was trivial with no mandatory minimum sentence.
Also, there were no police regulations here, as
there were in Robinson, which required the officer
to take Gustafson into custody. All of these fac-
tors were dismissed by the majority as irrelevant
to the constitutional issue. "It is sufficient that the
officer had probable cause to arrest the petitioner
and that he lawfully effectuated the arrest, and
placed the petitioner in custody." 414 U.S. at 264.
40 414 U.S. at 235.4 1 The state had argued in Gustafson that the
officer had reason to suspect that the driver was
intoxicated and that this would allow a full search
[Vol. 65
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also found that the search for weapons had ex-
ceeded the scope allowed for a mere search for
concealed weapons. Justice Marshall noted that
even if the cigarette pack did contain a
deadly weapon, it could not have done the
officers any harm since the pack was in their
possession. Thus, looking into the pack clearly
failed, in the opinion of the dissent, to satisfy
either ground for allowing a search incident to
arrest.
These two decisions give the police broad
power to search fully a person whom they ar-
rest for any violation. The police do not need
to tie the search to the justification of disarm-
ing the suspect or seeking evidence of the
crime for which the person was arrested. Still,
despite this rather broad authorization, there
are some limits and uncertainties as to how far
this decision will allow the police to go.
Those who disagree with this decision fear
the great possibility for abuse. The police may
make arrests for minor offenses in order to
justify a full search of the person. This con-
cern was shared by some members of the
Court and was specifically discussed by Justice
Stewart's concurring opinion in Gustafson.
Justice Stewart noted that it appeared that
Gustafson might have attacked as violative of
his rights the fact that he was placed under a
full arrest for such a minor charge. 42 Since no
such claim was made, however, he affirmed the
constitutionality of the full search that ensued.
Justice Powell also recognized that a claim by
Gustafson that the arrest was a mere pretext
of the driver to discover evidence of that fact. See
note 32 supra. Justice Marshall rejected this
theory since Gustafson was not even charged with
an offense involving intoxication.
42 414 U.S. at 266.
for a search would have presented a far differ-
ent question for the Court.43
Thus, present throughout the opinions in
these two cases is the realization of the possible
abuse by police and an implied willingness to
invalidate searches that were results of arrests
made for minor offenses or merely as an ave-
nue to enable the officer to search the person.
44
No such allegations reached the Supreme
Court in these two cases, but such allegations
may present a possible mode of attacking
searches made after certain minor traffic ar-
rests.
A continued requirement that the search be
reasonable in nature would also limit the full
search authorized by Robinson and Gustafson.
The majority did take care to state that the
search of Robinson "partook of none of the ex-
treme or patently abusive characteristics which
were held to violate the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment in Rochin v.
California."45 Thus, although the lawfulness of
the custodial arrest seems to give presumptive
reasonableness to the scope of the search sub-
sequent thereto, a standard of reasonableness
in the nature of the search must also be met.
43 414 U.S. at 238, n2. Justice Powell seems to
feel that any arrest made as a pretext for a search
would be invalid whether for a minor or serious
offense. Justice Stewart speaks only of an arrest
for a minor offense, yet he may be limiting him-
self to the facts of Gustafson and would arguably
agree with Justice Powell that when any arrest is
made as a mere pretext for a search, it must be
held invalid.
44 Given this possibility for abuse the solution
advocated by the dissent would be to disallow any
search not satisfying the stated purposes for allow-
ing the incident search. The majority would rather
determine if the arrest was made lawfully, i.e. not
as a mere pretext, and then permit any search of
the person thereafter.
45 342 U.S. at 165.
United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800(1974).
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
In addition to United States v. Robinson," internal struggle with the standards for war-
three more search-and-seizure cases in the Oc- rantless searches. The majority seemed willing
tober term 1973 illustrate the Supreme Court's to expand the exceptions to the fourth
1414 U.S. 218 (1973), See, Note, Search aid amendment's warrant requirement. The dis-
Seizure, 65 J. Cram. L. & C 448 (1974). sent argued for continuing the narrow inter-
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pretation of the exceptions for a search inci-
dent to an arrest, 2 an automobile search,3 and
third party consent to a search of property.
4
In all three cases there was no danger to the
arresting officer and no search for weapons.
The police found evidence of the same crime
for which the person was arrested. In all cases
there was sufficient cause for the issuance of a
search warrant, sufficient time to secure the
warrant, and almost no possibility that the evi-
dence would disappear while the police were
obtaining a warrant.
In United States v. Edwards,5 the defendant
was lawfully arrested late one night, was
charged with attempting to break into a post
office, and was incarcerated. Police investiga-
tion at the scene indicated the possibility that
evidence (paint chips from a window sill)
might be on the defendant's clothing. The next
morning the police gave the defendant a new-
ly-purchased T-shirt and trousers in exchange
for his clothing, which was then found to con-
tain paint chips. This evidence was received at
trial over the objection that the clothing and
the results of its examination were inadmissi-
ble because the warrantless seizure of the cloth-
ing was invalid under the fourth amendment.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 6
agreed with the defendant. Relying on Chimer
v. California,7 the court maintained a narrow
interpretation of the allowable search incident
to an arrest. As exceptions to the fourth
amendment's warrant requirement, such
searches were justifiable only to remove weap-
ons or seize evidence. Only the arrestee's per-
son and the area within his immediate control
could be searched.8
The Sixth Circuit said the facts of Edwards
provided cause to believe there was evidence.9
The clothing seized and searched certainly
was within his immediate control and probable
' United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 809
(1974).
3 Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 596 (1974).
4 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 178
(1974).
5 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
6 474 F.2d 1206 (6th Cir. 1973).
7 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
8 Id. at 762-63.
9 474 F.2d at 1210.
cause existed to believe that paint chips would
be found on the clothing.
Appellant's clothing could, therefore, properly
have been the subject of a search incident to a
lawful arrest because it was within the limited
area defined in Chimel.'0
But the court stated that the seizure of the
clothing was not substantially contemporaneous
with and confined to the immediate vicinity of
the arrest' It occurred after the administra-
tive process and mechanics of arrest had come
to a halt."s Ten hours was considered too long
a delay.
The Sixth Circuit in Edwards specifically
disagreed with the Second Circuit view in
United States v. Caruso."3 There, after contin-
uous pursuit from the scene of the crime, the
police apprehended the suspect and took him to
the local police station where his clothes were
removed, searched, and returned to him. After
arraignment, he was given regular prison garb,
and his own clothes were turned over to the
F.B.I. for use as evidence. There was a total
time lapse of about six hours between the mo-
ment of arrest and the final taking of his
clothes by the F.B.I.
The Second Circuit upheld the seizure of
clothing in Caruso, saying that "the clothes
were constantly in sight, were taken on the
person of the suspect at the time of arrest and
were continuously in custody." 14 The court
reasoned that these factors distinguished the
situation from that in Preston v. United
States,"5 which invalidated an automobile
search which was not undertaken until the oc-
cupants had been arrested and taken into cus-
tody and the car had been towed to a garage.
The Preston court stated that the search was
too remote in time or place to have been inci-
dental to an arrest:
Once an accused is under arrest and in cus-
tody, then a search made at another place,
10 Id.
11 Several non-Supreme Court cases upheld the
warrantless laboratory testing of the clothing of a
jailed person, but the Sixth Circuit said that the
time delay was not presented in those cases. 474
F.2d at 1210 n.1.
"2 474 F.2d at 1211.
13 358 F2d 184 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 862 (1966).
4 358 F2d at 185.
15 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
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without a warrant, is simply not incident to
the arrest. 6
In United States v. Williams,' 7 the Fifth
,Circuit, like the Second Circuit in Caruso, up-
held a seizure of clothing made several hours
after the arrest. The court distinguished an
earlier case18 which had invalidated a search of
clothing three days after the arrest.
Thus, in United States v. Edwards, the Su-
preme Court was faced with a developing split
in the circuits over the time limits on a war-
rantless search incident to a valid custodial ar-
rest How contemporaneous must the search
be? What circumstances can justify a delay in
the search? Viewing the alternatives presented
by the circuits, the Supreme Court clearly en-
dorsed the Second Circuit's Caruso approach.
[O]nce the defendant is lawfully arrested and
is in custody, the effects in his possession at
the place of detention that were subject to
search at the time and place of his arrest may
lawfully be searched and seized without a
warrant even though a substantial period of
time has elapsed between the arrest and subse-
quent administrative processing on the one
hand and the taking of the property for use as
evidence on the other.1 9
The Supreme Court decided the Edwards
case perfunctorily by referring to United
States v. Robinson.20  Searches incident to
16 376 U.S. at 367.
.7 416 F2d 4 (4th Cir. 1969).
38 Brett v. United States, 412 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.
1969). The defendant's clothes were taken from
him shortly after arrival at the jail, as was the
custom, and were held in routine jail custody for
ordinary safekeeping for three days. They were
searched, and incriminating evidence was found.
The majority held that the "search was not inci-
dent to an arrest, because it was not even close to
contemporaneous... Id. at 405.
29 415 U.S. at 807.
20 A custodial arrest of a suspect based on
probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under
the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being
lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires
no additional justification. It is the fact of the
lawful arrest which establishes the authority
to search and we hold that in the case of a
lawful custodial arrest a full search of the
person is not only an exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment but
it is also a 'reasonable' search under that
Amendment.
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235, cited
in United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. at 803 n.3.
custodial arrests were determined to be an ex-
ception to the warrant requirement,2' and this
exception:
has traditionally been justified by the reasona-
bleness of searching for weapons, instruments
of escape and evidence of crime when a per-
son is taken into official custody and lawfully
detained.
22
Writing for a majority of five, Mr. Justice
White did not discuss whether reasonableness
needs to be established in each arrest situation.
He did not compare the Robinson situation in
which there could be no further evidence dis-
covered and in which the officer admitted that
he was not searching for weapons. ApparentIy,
the only problem deserving discussion was the
delay in an otherwise justifiable search.
The facts of Caruso and Edwards facilitatec!
the Court's upholding the later seizure of the
clothing. A contemporaneous search would
have involved stripping the arrestee in a public
place23 or leaving him naked overnight in a
cell.24  The Court's answer was simple:
"searches and seizures that could be made on
the spot at the time of arrest may legally be
conducted later when the accused arrives at the
place of detention." 25
In response to the defendant's argument that
the police had plenty of time to obtain a search
warrant, the Court re-iterated an earlier hold-
ing that the test is "'not whether it was rea-
sonable to procure a search warrant, but
whether the search itself was reason-
able .... " The time period during which an
21 The Court cites Robinson, Chimel v. Califor-
nia, 395 U.S. 752, 755 (1969), and Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).22 415 U.S. at 802-03.
23United States v. Caruso, 359 F.2d at 185-86.
24United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. at 805.
25415 U.S. at 803, The Court cites Abel v.
United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960), in which the
defendant was arrested at a hotel and decided to
take the property with him to the place of deten-
tion.
26415 U.S. at 807, quoting from Cooper v. Cali-
fornia, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967). These same words
appear in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56, 66 (1950). In Cooper the accused was arrested
and his car was impounded and searched a week
later without a warrant. The search and seizure
were upheld, as the Edwards Court pointed out,
because they were
closely related to the reason petitioner was ar-
rested, the reason his car had been impounded,
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"incident search" may be conducted apparently
extends far beyond what laymen would consider
the "arrest."
II]t seems to us that the norina processes
incident to arrest and custody had not been
completed when Edwards was placed in his
cell on the night of May 31. With or without
probable cause, the authorities were entitled at
that point in time not only to search Edwards'
clothing but also to take it from him and keep
it in official custody. There was testimony that
this was the standard practice in the city.
(emphasis added) 
2 7
Again, taking the prisoner's clothes
was and is a normal incident of a custodial
arrest and reasonable delay in effectuat-
ing it does not change the fact that Edwards
was no more imposed upon than he could have
been at the time and place of the arrest or
immediately upon arrival at the place of deten-
tion. (emphasis added) 28
The Supreme Court majority defined the
"'arrest procedure" broadly enough to include
any of the routine practices at the station
house. This decision does not subject the ar-
restee to searches other than those to which he
could have been subjected at the time of the
arrest.
If the police clearly understand the limits of
a search at the moment of the initial encounter
with an arrestee, then this ruling does not re-
quire any new instructions to police. Indeed,
the decision endorses whatever searches are al-
ready routine, normal processes involved in
keeping the arrestee in custody. It eliminates
the necessity of obtaining a warrant.
In Edwards, a warrant would clearly have
issued. However, the decision expands ap-
proval of searches arising from an emergency
situation (the initial encounter, when evidence
could well disappear) to include non-emer-
gency situations in which the evidence could
not disappear while the police were obtaining a
and the reason it was being retained. . . . It
would have been unreasonable to hold that the
fpolice, having to retain the car in their cus-
,tody for such a length of time, had no right,
,even for their own protection to search it.
386 U.S. at 61.
27 415 U.S. at 804.
28 415 U.S. at 805.
warrant. The way is laid open, as it was in
Robinson, for pretextual arrests-perhaps for a
traffic violation-and later searches of person
and clothes "with or without probable cause"
29
to believe the clothes contain any evidence or
weapons. There simply needs to be a valid ar-
rest.
In Cardwell v. Lewis,30 the police secured
an arrest warrant at 8 a.m., anticipating an in-
terview with a murder suspect at 10 a.m. the
same morning. After a day of questioning, the
suspect was formally arrested late in the after-
noon. The police took his car keys and claim
check and arranged to have his car towed from
the public commercial lot to a police impound-
ment lot.
The next day a warrantless examination re-
vealed that a tire matched the cast of a tire
impression made at the scene of the crime and
that paint scrapings were not different from
foreign paint on the fender of the victim's car.
In habeas corpus proceedings, both the fed-
eral district court and the Sixth Circuit reversed
the conviction because the seizure and exami-
nation of the car violated the fourth amend-
ment.
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding
that no fourth amendment rights were invaded
by the police examination of the exterior of
the car (the tire and the paint). When proba-
ble cause existed, as it concededly did in this
case, 1 the examination of the exterior of the
car was not unreasonable and did not require a
warrant; 32 nor did the seizure require a war-
rant
Mr. Justice Blackmun. speaking for the plu-
rality, 3 distinguished automobile searches from
searches of a private home or office, stressing
that the "primary object of the Fourth Amend-
29415 U.S. at 804, quoted in text accompanying
footnote 22.
20 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
31 The district court had found that at 8 a.m.
there was nrobable cause to believe that the sus-
pect's car car been used in the commission of the
crime.
32 417 U.S. at 592.
33 Mr. Justice Powell's concurrence on other
grounds dilutes the significance of the plurality
opinion. Mr. Justice Powell would limit federal
collateral review of a state prisoner's fourth
amendment claims solely to the question of
whether he defendant was provided a full and fair
opportunity to litigate his claim in the state courts.
417 U.S. at 596.
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ment was determined to be the protection of
privacy," 34 and that the "right of privacy...
is the touchstone of our inquiry." 31 The mobil-
ity of automobiles justified searches under the
special exigency exception to the warrant re-
quirement of the fourth amendment. Further-
more, "[o]ne has a lesser expectation of pri-
vacy in a motor vehicle because its function is
transportation and it seldom serves as one's
residence or as the repository of personal
effects." 16
The issue then was
whether the examination of an automobile's
exterior upon probable cause invades a right
of privacy which the interposition of a war-
rant requirement is meant to protect.
37
In finding the probable cause search reasona-
ble, the plurality distinguished this search from
previous unreasonable car searches by saying
that this search involved the exterior of the
car and not personal effects.38 The decision
thereby upheld the search as not invading pri-
vacy.
The plurality opinion further held that
"[u]nder the circumstances of this case, the
seizure itself was not unreasonable." 39 Since
the police could have examined the car on the
spot, they could also seize it in order to facili-
tate the examination-as here where they
needed the lab facilities to make a cast of the
tire. The Court relied on Chambers v.
Maroney.40 In that case the police, acting on
information supplied by a service station at-
tendant and bystanders, arrested four men in
an auto shortly after an armed robbery. The
car was taken to the police station from the
highway, "a public place where access was not
meaningfully restricted." 41 A later warrantless
search produced incriminating evidence, which
was admitted in evidence.
The Chambers Court did not justify the
search as incident to the arrest. Rather, it cited
Carroll v. United States,42 and upheld the
34 417 U.S. at 589.
35 417 U.S. at 591.
36 417 U.S. at 590.
37 417 U.S. at 589.
38 417 U.S. at 591.
so 417 U.S. at 593.
40 393 U.S. 42 (1970).
411Id.
-2 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
search of the car because of its mobility. Given
that there was probable cause to search the car
for guns and stolen money, the Chambers
Court saw no difference under the fourth
amendment between (1) seizing and holding a
car before presenting the issue of probable
cause to a magistrate and (2) carrying out an
immediate warrantless search.
The Cardwell plurality conceived of the
Cardwell facts as being essentially the same as
the Chambers facts: the seizure was justified
by the "same considerations of exigency, im-
mobilization on the spot, and posting a guard.
. . .- Indeed, the plurality argued that the
Cardwell facts presented even more necessity
for immediate seizure, since there was some
possibility that the arrestee's lawyer or family,
might try to remove the car once they realized
that the man was under arrest.
It was irrelevant that for several months the
police had had probable cause to search the
car. It was irrelevant that the police could eas-
ily have secured a warrant during the previous
months or even during the interrogation of the
suspect. In short, the search and seizure were
justified by the existence of probable cause and
by what the plurality conceived to be exigent
circumstances.
The dissenting opinions in both Edwards
and Cardwell were written by Mr. Justice
Stewart, joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan,
and Marshall. Both dissents emphasized the same
considerations: there was plenty of time for
the police to obtain a warrant, there was no
possibility that the evidence would disappear.
The issue was considered to be whether the
government met its "burden of showing that the
circumstances of this seizure brought it within
one of the 'jealously and carefully drawn' ex-
ceptions to the warrant requirement." 44
The dissent argued that the government
failed to meet this burden. More specifically,
the dissent in Edwards argued that the inci-
dent exception should not be extended to in-
clude searches conducted a full ten hours after
the arrest. "[T]he mere fact of an arrest does
not allow the police to engage in warrantless
searches of unlimited geographic or temporal
scope." 45
43 417 U.S. at 594-95.44 United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. at 809.
45 Id. at 810.
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In Cardwell, the dissent argued that the au-
tomobile exception should be limited to situa-
tions involving a moving automobile, not to
situations in which there was "no reasonable
likelihood that the automobile would or could
be moved. . . ." 46 The Cardwel facts pre-
sented no more of an emergency at the time
of the arrest than had existed for the previous
hours or even months. The suspect had been
aware for several months that the police were
investigating him. Soon after the crime, the
police suspected that the car had been used to
push the victim's car over an embankment.
No prosecution spokesman, including the Sol-
icitor General as amicus curiae, proffered any
"satisfactory reason ... for the failure of the
law enforcement officers to have obtained a
warrant .... 147
The dissent characterized the plurality ap-
proach as talismanic. The Cardwell dissent
cited Coolidge v. New Hampshire48 (on which
the defendant had unsuccessfully relied) : "The
word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose
presence the Fourth Amendment fades away
and disappears." 4 9 'Similarly, in Edwards, the
dissent argued that an arrest should not func-
tion as a talisman to justify searches at a
much later time.
United Statesh v. Matlock,?' involved yet an-
other exception to the warrant requirement: the
consent to the warrantless search of property.
After the defendant was arrested in the front
yard, police requested consent to search the
house-not from the defendant, but from a
Mrs. Graff, the 23-year-old daughter of
the lessees. She consented to the search, which
included the bedroom she said was jointly oc-
cupied by the defendant and herself. The police
found $4,995 in a diaper bag in the only closet
in the room.
At a suppression hearing, the district court
held that where consent by a third person is
relied upon as justification for a search, the
government must show, inter alia, not only
that (1) it reasonably appeared to the officers
that the person had authority to consent but
.6 417 U.S. at 598.
- 417 U.S. at 598 n. 2.
48403 U.S. 443 (1971).
49 417 U.S. at 597, citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at
461-62.
50 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
also that (2) the person had actual authority
to permit the search. The court found that the
government failed to prove the latter require-
ment, namely, that Mrs. Graff had actual au-
thority to permit the search. This failure re-
sulted from the court's exclusion of testimony
about comments by Mrs. Graff and the defend-
ant that they were married and shared the
room. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court reversed by a 5-3 vote.
The Court cited Schneckloth v. Bustamonte51
for the general proposition that proper consent
voluntarily given validates a warrantless
search; it cited Frazier v. C11pp 52 and Coolidge
v. New Hampshire53 for the proposition that
the consent of one who possesses common au-
thority over, shares the mutual use of, or bears
other sufficient relationship to the premises or
effects is valid as against the absent, noncon-
senting person with whom that authority is
shared.
5 4
The district court followed these general
principles but excluded the evidence which
would have demonstrated that Mrs. Graff did
have the requisite authority to consent. The
court excluded Mrs. Graff's out-of-court state-
ments that she and the defendant regularly
slept in the east bedroom and testimony that at
various times and places both Mrs. Graff and
the defendant had represented themselves as
husband and wife.
The Supreme Court held that this testimony
should not have been excluded at the suppres-
sion hearing. Standards of admissibility at trial
differ essentially from standards at proceedings
in which a judge alone receives evidence and
gives it "such weight as his judgment and ex-
perience counsel." -5 The Court referred to Rule
104(a) [Preliminary Questions] of the pro-
posed Federal Rules of Evidence, which frees
the judge from rules of evidence except for
rules of privilege.58 The Court also cited Bri-
negar v. United States,57 which upheld the ad-
mission at a suppression hearing of evidence
which would have been inadmissible at the
trial itself.
51412 U.S. 218 (1973).
52 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
53 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
54 415 U.S. at 170-71, including n. 7.
55 Id. at 175.
56 Id. at 173-74.
57 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
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The Court was convinced that the govern-
ment had made the requisite showing of appro-
priate third party consent, but nevertheless re-
manded the issue to the district court for their
consideration of the weight of the evidence.
The facts of the case made the decision seem
reasonable: there was no reason to doubt that
the statements were made or to doubt the
truthfulness of the statements."" But it is not
clear whether this holding would apply in situ-
ations where the testimony was more suspect.
It is not clear whether the Court intends to re-
verse any and all exclusions from suppression
hearings.
To Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dissenting
opinion, the issue was not whether Mrs. Graff
had authority to consent, or even whether her
out-of-court statements were improperly ex-
cluded at the suppression hearing; rather, the
issue was whether the police should have ob-
tained a warrant. Justice Douglas pointed out
that the police rummaged throughout the entire
house at three different times during the day. 9
The district court found (and the govern-
ment did not contest) that there was no emer-
gency, that the searches were not incidental to
the arrest, and that there was adequate time to
obtain a search warrant. To Justice Douglas
this finding was crucial.
This search is impermissible because of the
failure of the officers to secure a search war-
rant when they had the opportunity to do so.60
Even when there is probable cause to search,
police must obtain a warrant except in very
narrowly prescribed circumstances.
Historically the warrant requirement sought
to interpose a magistrate between the overly-
zealous police and the citizen. The magistrate
would limit the scope of the search, thus con-
trolling unrestrained rummaging under the
58 415 U.S. at 175.
59 The appeal involved only the evidence found
in the first search.
60 415 U.S. at 180.
"feared general warrant," 61 a threat which
the fourth amendment was intended to elimi-
nate.
In emphasizing the traditional purpose of the
warrant requirement, Justice Douglas's dissent
echoed the dissents in Edwards and Cardwell.
The magistrate presumably protected the citizen
from unreasonable and overly-extensive
searches; the slight inconvenience of obtaining
the warrant paled beside the fundamental right
of privacy.
The other dissent in Matlock was written by
Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Mr. Justice
Marshall. The argument was the same as
Justice Brennan's dissent in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, namely, that one cannot be said to
have consented voluntarily to a search unless
one is made aware that he had a constitutional
right not to be searched. As applied to the Mat-
lock facts, this principle means that before the
evidence can be admitted, the court must deter-
mine that Mrs. Graff consented "knowing that
she was not required to consent." 62
In these three search and seizure cases, the
majority members of the Court demonstrated
their inclination to expand three exceptions to
the fourth amendment's warrant requirement.
Edwards expanded the time limits of a search
incident to an arrest; it allowed a search even
without reference to probable cause or to the
emergency by which the usual incident search
was justified. Cardwel expanded the probable
cause search of an automobile to include a sit-
uation of questionable exigency-a situation in
which the police had hours and even months to
secure a warrant. Matlock reversed the exclu-
sion of testimony at a suppression hearing; the
Court thus facilitated justification of a search
by consent of a third party in circumstances
where the police could easily have secured a
warrant. The majority consistently rejected the
dissents' arguments in all three cases that when
the police have time to secure a warrant, they
must.
61 Id. at 187.
62 Id. at 188.
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